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Awarding Attorneys' Fees to Prevailing Pro Se Litigants
Prevailing litigants in American courts have traditionally been
unable to recover attorneys' fees from their opponents. 1 This tradition animates the rules that govern awards of attorneys' fees in federal courts today. Unless reimbursement is specifically authorized
by statute, federal courts will not order losing litigants to pay reasonable attorneys' fees. 2 Although over seventy federal statutes contain
such authorization,3 the statutes do not expressly answer the ques1. See Alyeska Pipeline Serv. Co. v. Wilderness Socy., 421 U.S. 240, 247 (1975).
2. This is the so-called American rule. The rule was recently reaffirmed in Alyeska Pipeline Serv. Co. v. Wilderness Socy., 421 U.S. 240 (1975). Courts make exceptions to this rule
when the losing party is adjudged to have sued in bad faith or for harassment purposes, 421
U.S. at 258-59, and when the prevailing party wins an award that will also benefit a group, in
which case he may take his fees from the award. 421 U.S. at 257-58. Shareholder derivative
suits are a good example. The American rule has been criticized because it fails to make a
litigant whole following the successful completion of his lawsuit. It also is said to favor the
wealthy over the poor because the former always have access to legal counsel while the latter
have access only when the case promises a large enough award to justify taking the case on a
contingent fee basis. See Ehrenzweig, Reimbursement of Counsel Fees and the Great Society,
54 CALIF. L. REV. 792 (1966); Kuenzel, The Attorney's Fee: Why Not a Cost ofLitigation?, 49
IOWA L. REV. 75 (1963).
3. For a listing of federal attorneys' fees statutes, see Public Participation in Federal Agency
Proceedings Act of 1977: Hearings on S. 270 Before the Subcomm. on Administrative Practice
and Procedure of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 677, 707-19 (1977)
(article by Henry Cohen, Awards ofAttorneys' Fees in Federal Courts and by Federal Agencies).
Most of these statutes have been enacted in the past two decades. The proliferation of attorneys' fees statutes may reflect growing congressional disenchantment with the American rule.
Congress' recent enactment of the Equal Access to Justice Act, § 204, 94 Stat. 2325 (1980)
(codified at 28 U.S.C.A. § 2412(a)-(d)), may reflect this disenchantment. The Act allows prevailing parties to recover attorneys' fees in any civil action against the federal government,
unless the government can show that its position in the case was "substantially justified or that
special circumstances make an award unjust." 28 U.S.C.A. § 2412(d)(l)(A) (West Supp. 1981).
The Congressional Budget Office's best estimate is that this provision will result in the government paying attorneys' fees in 25% of its losing cases. H.R. REP. No. 1418, 96th Cong., 2d
Sess. 22, reprinted in [1980) U.S. CODE CONG. & Ao. NEWS 4984, 5001. No one can know, of
course, how the courts will apply this language. For this reason, perhaps, Congress provided ·
that the new law will expire on October l, 1984, unless it is reenacted. Equal.Access to Justice
Act, Pub. L. No. 96-481, § 204(c), 94 Stat. 2325 (1980). The Act became effective October 1,
1981. Equal Access to Justice Act, Pub. L. No. 96-481, § 208, 94 Stat. 2325 (1980). Despite its
revolutionary potential, the Act should not affect the attorneys' fees statutes discussed in this
Nqte. The Act states that none ofits provisions is intended to modify any prior statute authorizing attorneys' fees awards against the United States. Equal Access to Justice Act, Pub. L.
No. 96-481, § 206, 94 Stat. 2325 (1980).
Although some statutes make attorneys' fees awards mandatory, see, e.g., Clayton Act § 4,
15 U.S.C. § 15 (1976); Truth in Lending Act § 130(a)(3), 15 U.S.C. § 1640(a)(3) (1976), most
statutes give the courts discretion in deciding whether to reimburse prevailing parties. In response, the courts have used elaborate tests for determining both if an attorney's fee is allowable, and, if allowable, in what amount. See, e.g., Blue v. Bureau of Prisons, 570 F.2d 529 (5th
Cir. 1978) (specifying four criteria for deciding whether attorneys' fees should be awarded in a
Freedom of Information Act case); Palmigiano v. Garrahy, 616 F.2d 598 (1st Cir.), cert. denied,
449 U.S. 839 (1981) (enumerating 12 factors for determining the size ofan attorney's fee award
in civil rights cases).
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tion whether a successful pro se litigant4 may recover a fee as compensation for the legal work that he has performed. It is not
surprising, therefore, that the courts of appeals have reached confl.icting conclusions on this issue. Most of the circuit courts have refused to allow attorneys' fees for prose litigants. 5 The District of
Columbia Circuit, in contrast, has consistently sanctioned such
awards. 6 And several circuits have given different answers depending on the pro se party's status - recovery has turned on whether he
was an attorney, an average citizen, or a prisoner.7
4. "Prose" is the phrase usually used to describe parties who represent themselves in legal
matters. It means "for himself." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1364 (4th ed. 1951). Another
phrase that is sometimes used is "in propria persona," which means "in one's own proper person." Id. at 899.
A federal right to self-representation was first statutorily granted in § 35 of the Judiciary
Act of 1789, I Stat 92. It is currently codified as follows: "In all courts of the United States
the parties may plead and conduct their own cases personally or by counsel .•••" 28 U.S.C.
§ 1654 (1976).
Federal enactment of this provision reflected the colonial-era hostility toward paid counsel.
In the seventeenth century, Massachusetts, Connecticut, Virginia, and the Carolinas all outlawed the practice oflaw for hire. L. FRIEDMAN, A HISTORY OF AMERICAN LAW 81 (1973).
As commercial enterprise grew in the colonies, the need for lawyers gradually began to overcome this hostility. Id. at 84. Following the Revolutionary War, however, there was a resurgence of animosity toward the bar, in part because most of the leading lawyers of the day were
Tories, and in part because most of the lawyers were spending their time collecting debts in a
depressed postwar economy. C. WARREN, A HISTORY OF THE AMERICAN BAR 212-24 (1911 ).
There was also concern about lawyers forming a postwar aristocracy - the Constitution, for
example, was largely the work oflawyers. Id. at 218. This distrust of the legal profession was
made manifest first in laws passed by the states (Massachusetts enacted statutes in 1785 and
1786 that guaranteed citizens the right to argue their own causes in court), and later in§ 35 of
the Judiciary Act
In recent years, the major disputes in federal courts over the right to self-representation
have involved the defendant's right to refuse state-appointed counsel and argue his own case.
In Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806 (1975), the Supreme Court held that a defendant had a
constitutionally protected right under the sixth amendment to refuse appointed counsel and
appear in his own defense, even if that meant he would receive a less effective defense.
S. The First, Third, Fourth, Fifth, Eighth, and Tenth Circuits have refused to award attorneys' fees to prose litigants. See Lovell v. Snow, 637 F.2d 170-71 (1st Cir. 1981) (Civil Rights
Attorney's Fees Awards Act) (CRAFAA)); Crooker v. United States Dept. of Justice, 632 F.2d
916, 920-22 (1st Cir. 1980) (Freedom of Information Act (FOIA)); Cunningham v. FBI, 664
F.2d 383 (3d Cir. 1981) (FOIA); White v. Arlen Realty & Dev. Corp., 614 F.2d 387, 389 (4th
Cir.), cert. denied, 447 U.S. 923 (1980) (Truth in Lending Act (fILA)); Barrett v. Bureau of
Customs, 651 F.2d 1087, 1090 (5th Cir. 1981) (Privacy Act); Cofield v. City of Atlanta, 648
F.2d 986, 987-88 (5th Cir. 1981) (CRAFAA); Davis v. Parratt, 608 F.2d 717, 718 (8th Cir.
1979) (CRAFAA); Burke v. United States Dept of Justice, 432 F. Supp. 251, 253 (D. Kan.
1976), a.ffd., 559 F.2d 1182 (10th Cir. 1977) (FOIA).
6. See Crooker v. United States Dept of the Treasury, No. 80-1412 (D.C. Cir. Oct. 23,
1980) (FOIA); Cox v. United States Dept. of Justice, 601 F.2d I, 5-6 (D.C. Cir. 1979) (per
curiam) (FOIA); Cuneo v. Rumsfeld, 553 F.2d 1360, 1366 (D.C. Cir. 1977); Parker v. Lewis,
[1981] Empl. Prac. Guide (CCH) f 32,153 (D.D.C. June 30, 1981) (Title VII of Civil Rights
Act of 1964); Quinto v. Legal Times of Washington, Inc., 511 F. Supp. 579, 581 (D.D.C. 1981)
(Copyright Act).
7. The Ninth Circuit has awarded attorneys' fees to a prose attorney. See Ellis v. Cassidy,
625 F.2d 227, 230 (9th Cir. 1980) (CRAFAA). But it has denied them to a nonattorney prose
litigant See Hannon v. Security Natl. Bank, 537 F.2d 327, 328 (9th Cir. 1976) (TILA). The
Second Circuit has denied attorneys' fees to a prose prisoner, but left open the possibility that
they may be available for other classes ofprose litigants. See Crooker v. United States Dept.
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This Note examines- the propriety of awarding attorneys' fees to
prevailingpro se litigants8 in the federal courts.9 It focuses on the
four major statutes under which almost all pro se cases have been
filed: 10 the Freedom of Information Act of 197411 (FOIA), the Privacy Act of 197412 (Privacy Act), the Civil Rights Attorney's Fees
Awards Act of 1976 13 (CRAFAA), and the Truth in Lending Act 14
(TILA). In so doing, it will attempt to devise common principles
that can be applied to most requests for pro se attorneys' fees. Part I
looks first to the statutes' language and legislative histories to determine whether Congress authorized awards of attorneys' fees to
prevailingpro se litigants. Part II discusses the policy arguments for
and against awarding attorneys' fees in this context. The Note concludes that awarding fees to pro se litigants is not only statutorily
authorized, but also desirable as a matter of policy.
I. STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION
Any attempt to determine a statute's meaning must begin with an
examination of its language. 15 All four of the relevant statutes authorize the court to require a losing party to pay "reasonable attorney fees" to the prevailing litigant. 16 Some courts have read these
of the Treasury, 634 F.2d 48, 49 (2d Cir. 1980) (FOIA). And the Fifth Circuit, while refusing
to grantprose attorneys' fees on two separate occasions, has recently held open the possibility
that prose attorneys may be eligible for reimbursement for their legal expenses. See Barrett v.
Bureau of Customs, 651 F.2d 1087, 1089 (5th Cir. 1981).
8. For purposes of this Note, it is assumed that if the pro se party had hired a lawyer, he
would have been reimbursed for his attorneys' fees.
9. The issue ofprose attorneys' fees has arisen at the state level as well. There, however,
the debate has centered around whether attorneys who represent themselves are entitled to
receive legal fees. Compare Winer v. Jona! Corp., 169 Mont. 247,545 P.2d 1094 (1976), and
Wells v. Whinery, 34 Mich. App. 626, 192 N.W.2d 81 (1971) (attorneys' fees awarded), with
O'Connell v. Zimmerman, 157 Cal App. 2d 330, 321 P.2d 161 (1958) (fees denied, although in
a footnote to a recent decision, the California Supreme Court noted that it failed to understand
the logic of previous court decisions disallowing attorneys' fees for pro se attorneys; see Consumers Lobby Against Monopolies v. Public Util. Commn., 25 Cal 3d 891, 915 n.13, 603 P.2d
41, 55 n.13, 160 Cal Rptr. 124 n.13 (1979)). Because of the dearth of decisions at the state level
on whether nonattorney prose litigants may recover attorneys' fees, this Note will focus on the
federal courts.
10. This natural concentration of cases will simplify the analysis. Moreover, the courts'
tendency to look for guidance in decisions made under the various statutes justifies such an
approach. See, e.g., Barrett v. Bureau of Customs, 651 F.2d 1087, 1088-89 (5th Cir. 1981)
(wherein the court cites almost every pro se attorneys' fees case decided to date); Crooker v.
United States Depl of the Treasury, 634 F.2d 48, 49 (2d Cir. 1980); Ellis v. Cassidy, 625 F.2d
227, 230 (9th Cir. 1980).
11. 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(4)(E) (1976).
12. 5 u.s.c. § 552a(g)(3)(B) (1976).
13. 42 u.s.c. § 1988 (1976).
14. 15 U.S.C. § 1640(a) (1976).
15. "And as with any case involving the interpretation of a statute, our analysis must begin
with the language of the statute itself." Touche Ross & Co. v. Redington, 442 U.S. 560, 568
(1979).
16. FOIA: "The court may assess against the United States reasonable attorney fees and
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words narrowly to preclude the award of pro se attorneys' fees. 17
Under their interpretations, the word "fee" means that money must
be owed by one person to another for services rendered by the latter
to the former. The word "attorney" means that the person owed the
money must be a licensed member of the bar. Since the language
"presupposes a relationship of attorney and client" 18 that is lacking
in the case ofpro se litigants, and because pro se litigants are not
usually attorneys, they may not be compensated.
Although this argument is facially appealing, it is not compelling
because it assumes that attorneys' fees must be actually incurred
before they can be reimbursed. This assumption is not mandated by
the statutes' language. The laws say nothing about actually incurring the expense; they merely authorize courts to award reasonable
attorneys' fees to prevailing parties. Their language is not contradicted if fees are awarded without regard to whether a lawyer has
been hired or is owed any money. The phrase "attorney fee" can
reasonably be interpreted as simply a generic description of compensation to a person who performs legal services. Under this interpretation, prevailing parties would still collect attorneys' fees in
compliance with the language. If the litigant hires an attorney, the
fee goes from the litigant's pocket to his attorney's; if the litigant
represents himself, he retains the money.
The argument for a narrow reading of the statutes' language is
further undercut because the reading has not been consistently applied by its advocates. The courts that oppose awards to pro se litigants have refused to interpret "attorney fee" narrowly in other fact
situations. For example, a number of courts have held that attorneys' fees can be awarded to a prevailing plaintiff even when his
legal services have been provided free of charge by a legal services
organization. 19 In these cases, the plaintiff owed no fees and had
other litigation costs reasonably incurred in any case under this section in which the complainant has substantially prevailed." 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(4)(E) (1976). Privacy Act: same as FOIA.
5 U.S.C. § 552a(g)(3)(B) (1976). CRAFAA: "In any action or proceeding to enforce a provision of section 1981, 1982, 1983, 1985, and 1986 of this title •.. , the court, in its discretion,
may allow the prevailing party, other than the United States, a reasonable attorney's fee as
part of the costs." 42 U.S.C. § 1988 (1976). TILA: "(A]ny creditor who fails to comply with
any requirement . . . is liable • . . in the case of any succcessful action [for] a reasonable
attorney's fee as determined by the court." 15 U.S.C. § 1640(a) (1976).
17. See Cunningham v. FBI, 664 F.2d 383, 384 (3d Cir. 1981); Davis v. Parratt, 608 F.2d
717, 718 (8th Cir. 1979) (per curiam).
18. Davis v. Parratt, 608 F.2d 717, 718 (8th Cir. 1979) (per curiam); see Cunningham v.
FBI, 664 F.2d 383, 384 (3d Cir. 1981) ("As an initial matter this statutory provision for 'attorney fees' would appear on its own terms to be predicated on the presence of an attorney.").
19. The First, Third, Fifth, and Ninth Circuits have taken this position. See Kessler v.
Associates Fin. Serv. Co., 639 F.2d 498,499 (9th Cir. 1981); Palmigiano v. Garrahy, 616 F.2d
598 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 839 (1980); Rodriguez v. Taylor, 569 F.2d 1231, 1244-46
(3d Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 436 U.S. 913 (1978); Sellers v. Wollman, 510 F.2d 119, 128 (5th Cir.
1975). Of course, the monies do not stay with the plaintiff but go directly to the legal services
organization. But that is as it should be. The organization, not the plaintiff, performed the
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incurred no costs. Similarly, courts have allowed reimbursement for
work performed by nonattorneys: Paralegal expenses have frequently been awarded as part of a larger award of attorneys' fees. 20
Compensation, therefore, need not only be for an attorney's work.
A second argument against awarding fees to pro se litigants is
peculiar to the language of the FOIA and the Privacy Act. Both
statutes allow recovery of "reasonable attorney fees and other litigation costs reasonably incurred in any case . . . in which the complainant has substantially prevailed."21 In Cunningham v. FBI, 22 the
Third Circuit held that the phrase "reasonably incurred" modified
"reasonable attorney fees" as well as "other litigation costs."23 The
court reasoned that the word "reasonable" before "attorney fees"
means only that the rate of compensation must not be excessive.
The "reasonably incurred" language is thus a necessary modifier for
"attorney fee" because it ensures that the amount of time for which
the lawyer is compensated will not be excessive.24 This interpretation reads in a requirement that attorneys' fees be incurred before
they can be reimbursed. Under this interpretation, pro se litigants
cannot be awarded attorneys' fees because they have not actually
incurred any legal expenses. The First and Fifth Circuits have
reached similar conclusions.25
There are several problems with this analysis. First, there are
indications that the "incurred" requirement will be applied inconsistently in this context as well. The Cunningham opinion, for example,
suggested that if an FOIA plaintiff is represented by a legal services
legal work. Awards of this kind can be justified on the ground that they further the purposes
of the attorneys' fees statutes. They encourage litigation by providing legal aid organizations
with an incentive to take these kinds of cases. Also, in times of budget cutbacks, these kinds of
awards can help provide the resources to guarantee a minimum level of free legal aid to the
poor.
20. See, e.g., Jones v. Armstrong Cork Co., 630 F.2d 324, 325 n.l (5th Cir. 1980) ("Had
Ms. Smith been a paralegal, then to the extent that she performed work that has traditionally
been done by an attorney, Ms. Turner would have been entitled to have compensation for that
work separately assessed and included in her award."); Northcross v. Board of Educ., 611 F.2d
624,639 (6th Cir. 1979), cert. denied., 441 U.S. 911 (1980); Lamphere v. Brown Univ., 610 F.2d
46, 48 (1st Cir. 1979); McNeil v. Ogburn, 507 F. Supp. 96, 96-99 (N.D. Fla. 1981); Selzer v.
Berkowitz, 477 F. Supp. 686, 690-91 & nn.3-4 (E.D.N.Y. 1979); Falcon v. General Tel. Co.,
463 F. Supp. 315, 321 (N.D. Tex. 1978), qffd in part and remanded in part, 626 F.2d 369 (5th
Cir. 1980), vacated and remanded, 450 U.S. 1036 (1981); Aumiller v. University of Del., 455 F.
Supp. 676,682 & n.13 (D. Del. 1978), qffd mem., 594 F.2d 854 (3d Cir. 1979); Comment, Pro
Se Litigant's Eligibilityfor Attorney Fees Under FOIA: Crooker v. United States Department
of Justice, 55 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 520, 533 (1981).
21. 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(4)(E) (1976) (FOIA) (emphasis added); 5 U.S.C. § 552a(g)(3)(B)
(1976) (Privacy Act) (emphasis added).
22. 664 F.2d 383 (3d Cir. 1981).
23. 664 F.2d at 385.
24. 664 F.2d at 385.
25. See Barrett v. Bureau of Customs, 651 F.2d 1087, 1089 (5th Cir. 1981); Crooker v.
United States Dept. of Justice, 632 F.2d 916, 921 n.7 (1st Cir. 1980).
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organization, then he can be awarded attorneys' fees, even though
his legal services are provided free of charge and he does not actually incur any legal expenses.26
Second, the Third Circuit's approach seems a tortured reading of
straightforward language. As the District of Columbia Circuit has
pointed out, it makes more sense grammatically to hold that "reasonably incurred" modifies only "other litigation costs" and not "attorney fees" because "attorney fees" already has its own
"reasonable" modifi.er. 27 More to the point, had Congress intended
to require that attorneys' fees cover only the services of retained attorneys, it could have said so clearly.28
Third, one can reasonably infer that Congress used the phrase
"other litigation costs reasonably incurred" to direct that the courts
be more liberal in awarding costs. Costs are ordinarily taxed to the
losing party in a lawsuit29 under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
54(d). The courts, however, have interpreted the rule and other relevant statutes to preclude reimbursement of some costs incurred by
prevailing parties in litigation.30 Major items such as investigation
expenses, travel expenses, and expert witness fees, along with minor
items like telephone calls and taxi fares, are often excluded from cost
recoveries. 31 Since these judicial interpretations are well known, it is
plausible that Congress authorized payment of "other litigation costs
reasonably incurred" to broaden the category of costs that could be
26. Cunningham v. FBI, 664 F.2d 383, 385 n.1 (3d Cir. 1981).
27. Cuneo v. Rumsfeld, 553 F.2d 1360, 1366 (D.C. Cir. 1977).
28. See text at note 19 supra.
29. While the original rule excluded an award of costs against the United States, 28 U.S.C.
§ 2412(a) (Supp. IV 1980) now provides that costs may be taxed against the government. The
courts have interpreted the statute as giving them the same discretion as they have in taxing
costs against private litigants. See Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. EPA, 512 F.2d
1351, 1353 (D.C. Cir. 1975); Puerto Rico v. S.S. Zoe Colotroni, 456 F. Supp. 1327, 1351
(D.P.R. 1978); 10 C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 2672, at
170 (1973). This interpretation is supported by the statute's legislative history. See H.R. REP,
No. 1535, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. 3 (1966).
30. The courts look to 28 U.S.C § 1920 (1976) for guidelines regarding what costs are allowable. C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, supra note 29, § 2670, at 157-58. Section 1920 allows
taxing the following costs:
(I) Fees of the clerk and marshal; (2) Fees of the court reporter for all or any part of the
stenographic transcript necessarily obtained for use in the case; (3) Fees and disbursements for printing and witnesses; (4) Fees for exemplification and copies of papers necessarily obtained for use in the case; (5) Docket fees under section 1923 of this title; (6)
Compensation of court appointed experts, compensation of interpreters, and salaries, fees,
expenses, and costs of special interpretation services under section 1828 of this title. ,
28 U.S.C. § 1920 (Supp. IV 1980).
In addition, the courts have discretion to award a few other costs, such as the costs of
depositions. See C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, supra note 29, § 2676 and cases cited therein. This
discretion, however, is to be used sparingly. Farmer v. Arabian Am. Oil Co., 319 U.S. 227, 235
(1964).
31. See C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, supra note 29, § 2677, at 223-25 and cases cited therein;
id § 2678, at 236-37 and cases cited therein.
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recovered. If so, every cost that was reasonably incurred in pursuing
either a Privacy Act or FOIA claim would be eligible for :i;ecovery,
not just those expenses that have traditionally been considered reimbursable.32 Under this reading, the words "reasonably incurred" impose no restrictions on awards of attorneys' fees.
The preceding discussion makes clear that the meaning of these
statutes is open to various interpretations. Since "the statutory language is not dispositive of the issue,"33 it is necessary to examine the
legislative history to ascertain whether the Congress intended to authorize recovery of legal fees by pro se litigants.34
Unfortunately, the committee reports and congressional debates
on these four statutes do not mentionprose parties.35 Congress, evidently, did not anticipate the problem. In this situation, the appropriate next step is predicting what Congress would have done if it
had considered the question, "starting from the areas where the legislative intent is readily discernible, and projecting to fair and reasonable corollaries of that intent for the specific issue before us." 36
This analysis yields a conclusion that Congress' intent can best be
32. This reading of the clause is also consistent with advancing the major congressional
purpose for enacting these attorneys' fees statutes, namely, to encourage litigation. See text at
notes 37-44 infra. Another possible approach would be to classify the pro se litigant's time
spent preparing the case as an "other litigation cost" and pay the litigant accordingly.
33. Crooker v. United States Dept. of the Treasury, 634 F.2d 48, 49 (2d Cir. 1980).
34. There are two circumstances in which this court may look beyond the express language of a statute in order to give force to Congressional intent: where the statutory
language is ambiguous; and where a literal interpretation would thwart the purpose of the
over-all statutory scheme or lead to an absurd result.
United States v. Tex-Tow, Inc., 589 F.2d 1310, 1313 (7th Cir. 1978) (quoting International Tel
& Tel Corp. v. General Tel & Elec. Corp., 518 F.2d 913, 917-18 (9th Cir. 1975)). In this case,
the phrases "attorney fee" and "other litigation costs reasonably incurred" are ambiguous as
they apply to pro se litigants.
35. See S. REP. No. 1011, 94th Gong., 2d Sess. 1, reprinted in [1976) U.S. CODE CONG. &
AD. NEWS 5908 (CRAFAA) [hereinafter cited as CRAFAA REPoRT]; H.R. REP. No. 1558,
94th Cong., 2d Sess. 1 (1976) (CRAFAA); H.R. REP. No. 876, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 6, reprinted
in [1974] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 6267, 6272 (FOIA); S. REP. No. 854, 93d Cong., 2d
Sess. 17-19 (1974) (FOIA}; S. REP. No. 1183, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 83, reprinted in [1974) U.S.
CODE CoNG. & AD. NEWS 6916, 6997 (Privacy Act); H.R. REP. No. 1416, 93d Cong., 2d Sess.
17 (1974) (Privacy Act); H.R. CoNF. REP. No. 1429, 93d Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in [1974)
U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 6148 (fILA); s. REP. No. 902, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. (1974)
(TU.A).
36. Montana Power Co. v. Federal Power Commn., 445 F.2d 739, 746 (D.C. Cir. 1970)
(footnote omitted), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 1013 (1971). See United States v. Sisson, 399 U.S.
267, 297-98 (1976) ("The axiom that courts should endeavor to give statutory language that
meaning that nurtures the policies underlying legislation is one that guides us when circumstances not plainly covered by the terms of a statute are subsumed by the underlying policies to
which Congress was committed."); Portland Cement Assn. v. Ruckelshaus, 486 F.2d 375 (D.C.
Cir.), cert. denied, 417 U.S. 921 (1973); B. CARDOZO, THE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS
16 (1921) ("You may call this process legislation, if you wilL In any event, no system ofjus
scriptum has been able to escape the need ofit."); J. GRAY, THE NATURE AND So_uRCES OF
THE LAW 173 (2d ed. 1938). See generally 2A J. SUTHERLAND, STATUTES AND STATUTORY
CoNSTRUCTION § 45.09 (4th ed. C. Sands ed. 1973).
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effectuated by allowing prevailingpro se litigants to recover attorneys' fees.
. Congress had two basic reasons for carving exceptions from the
general rule that parties must pay their own attorneys' fees. The first,
a~d most important, was to encourage the vindication of legal rights
through the judicial process.37 The statutes authorize awards of attorneys' fees in areas where Congress has established important national policies whose success depends on significant private
enforcement efforts.38 Awarding attorneys' fees encourages parties
whose rights have been violated to seek vindication in the courtroom39 since it reduces the plaintifl's expected cost of going to trial.40
· The importance placed on judicial protection of individual rights
37.. See CRAFAA REPORT, supra note 35, at 2, (1976] U.S. CODE CONG. & Ao. NEWS at
5910 ("All of these civil rights laws depend heavily upon private enforcement, and fee awards
have proven an essential remedy if private citizens are to have a meaningful opportunity to
vindicate the important Congressional policies which these laws contain."),
In Cunningham v. FBI, 664 F.2d 383 (3d Cir. 1981), the Third Circuit suggested that Congress did not intend the FOIA as an incentive to litigation. "But the legislative history to the
1974 FOIA amendments, w~ch authorized attorney fee awards, suggests that Congress did not
mean to create positive incentives to litigation. Rather, Congress' expressed concern was to
remove obstacles to legitimate claims . . . ." 664 F.2d at 387. The court seems to be attempting a semantic sleight-of-hand. All legitimate claims, absent an attorneys' fees statute, face the
obstacle of attorneys' fees. Removing that obstacle will encourage a number of people to file
claims who otherwise would not have filed.
38. See S. REP. No. 854, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 18 (1974) ("Congress has established in the
FOIA a national policy of disclosure of government information, and the committee finds it
appropriate and desirable, in order to effectuate that policy, to provide for the assessment of
attorneys' fees against the government where the plaintiff prevails in FOIA litigation." (emphasis added)); note 37 supra.
39. See CRAFAA REPORT, supra note 35, at 2, (1976] U.S. CODE CONG. & Ao. NEWS at
5910 ("If private citizens are to be able to assert their civil rights, and if those who violate the
Nation's fundamental laws are not to proceed with impunity, then citizens must have the opportunity to recover what it costs them to vindicate their rights in court."); S. REP. No. 854,
93d Cong., 2d Sess. 18 (1974). Implicit in this argument is the belief that those whose rights
have been violated will win at trial.
40. The expected cost of an event is the weighted average of costs associated with every
possible outcome of the event; weights are given by the respective probabilities of each possible
outcome. This is more co=only referred to as the "expected value" of an event. See ].
KMENTA, ELEMENTS OF ECONOMETRICS 57-59 (1971). For example, a lawsuit is an "event"
having two possible "outcomes": a win or a loss. A litigant's expected cost of the lawsuit is
determined by the following calculation: ({litigant's chance of winning) X (cost if win)] +
[(litigant's chance oflosing) x (cost if lose)]. See id. at 58. Suppose that a person's rights have
been violated and that he wishes to sue the government. Assume, first, that the violation is
blatant and that the litigant will quite likely win, ie., that the probability of the person winning is 90%. Assume further that each side will incur attorneys' costs of $500, and (for simplicity) that this is the only cost that each side will incur. Without an attorneys' fees award
provision, the plaintiff's expected lawsuit cost is: ((0.90) x ($500)] + ((0.10) X ($500)] = $450 +
$50 = $500. With an attorneys' fees award provision allowing both sides to recover, the plaintiff's expected lawsuit cost is: ((0.90) X ($0)] + ((0.10) X ($1000)] = $0 + $100 = $100. The
plaintiff's cost of vindicating his right is, therefore, reduced by the attorney's fees provision.
Note, however, that this will be true only for the plaintiff who has better than a 50% chance of
winning; this is because the losing plaintiff will be saddled with the government's attorneys'
fees. Congress has mitigated this effect by precluding the award of attorneys' fees to prevailing
defendants. See notes 41-44 i'!fra and accompanying text.
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is evinced by the unbalanced standard that Congress adopted for
awarding attorneys' fees. If, for example, a statute allowed all prevailing parties to collect attorneys' fees, individuals arguably might
be discouraged from initiating lawsuits by the fear of having to pay
the defendant's attorneys' fees. Recognizing and wishing to prevent
this disincentive to individual suits, Congress expressly created a
double standard: In most cases, attorneys' fees can be granted only
to prevailing plaintiffs and not to prevailing defendants. Under this
approach, people who sue need not fear a double penalty if they lose.
Three of the statutes - the FOIA, Privacy Act, and TILA41 - absolutely prohibit recovery by defendants. And while the language of
the CRAFAA appears to make legal expenses equally available to
both plaintiffs and defendants,42 the committee report accompanying
the bill outlined a double standard: Plaintiffs "should ordinarily recover an attorney's fee unless special circumstances would render
such an award unjust,"43 but prevailing defendants should recover
only if they can show that the plaintiff's suit was "clearly frivolous,
vexatious, or brought for harassment purposes."44
Attorneys' fees statutes also seek to induce potential defendants
to comply with the law. When a defendant is forced to pay the
plaintiff's attorneys' fees, he incurs a cost over and above that normally encountered in civil litigation. This additional cost can help to
deter violations of the law, especially in cases where the actual damages are small or nonexistent.45 As the Senate committee report on
41. The Freedom of Information and Privacy Acts both provide that ''The court may assess against the United States reasonable attorney fees . . . ." 5 U.S.C. §§ 552(a)(4)(E),
552a(g)(3)(B) (1976). The government is always the defendant and always the only party liable for attorneys' fees. The TILA provides that "[A]ny creditor who fails [to comply] . . . is
liable ..• [for] a reasonable attorney's fee." 15 U.S.C. § 1640(a) (1976). The creditor is always the defendant and always the only one liable.
42. "[T]he court, in its discretion, may allow the prevailing party . . . a reasonable attorney's fee as part of the costs." 42 U.S.C. § 1988 (1976).
43. CRAFAA REPORT, supra note 35, at 4, [1976) U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS at 5912.
The committee drew its standard from Newman v. Piggie Park Enterprises, 390 U.S. 400, 402
(1968), a case interpreting a similar attorneys' fees statute in Title II of the Civil Rights Act of
1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000a-3(b) (1976).
44. CRAFAA REPORT, supra note 35, at 5, [1976] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS at 5912.
This is basically the same standard adopted by the Supreme Court in Christiansburg Garment
Co. v. EEOC, 434 U.S. 412 (1978), a case interpreting the attorneys' fees provision in Title VII
of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(k) (1976). Not all attorneys' fees statutes
are as generous to plaintiffs as are these four. See, e.g., Consumer Product Safety Act, 15
U.S.C. § 2060(c) (1976); Copyrights Act, 17 U.S.C. § 505 (1976) (allowing the court to award
attorneys' fees to either party). Perhaps the reason for this dichotomy is simple congressional
oversight. The same thing may have happened with the civil rights attorneys' fees statutes Congress erred by allowing either party to collect, the courts corrected the mistake, and Congress followed the courts' lead in subsequent legislation. See also Federal Contested Election
Act, 2 U.S.C. § 396 (1976) (allows fees for either party payable from a special congressional
fund for that purpose).
45. Actions brought under the FOIA, for example, involve no claim for damages at all; the
plaintiff is merely seeking release of government-held information.
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the FOIA explained it, "If the government had to pay legal fees each
time it lost a case, . . . it would be much more careful to oppose
only those [cases) it had a strong chance of winning."46 Several
courts have also noted this deterrent purpose behind the attorneys'
fees statutes.47
Both of these purposes will be inadequately served if awards of
attorneys' fees are confined to litigants who actually hire a lawyer.
First, contrary to some courts' contentions, allowing litigants to recover the reasonable fees of retained attorneys will not, by itself, ensure judicial vindication of individual rights.48 There are many
potential litigants of modest means who may not hire a lawyer to
represent them even when awards of attorneys' fees are available.
These people realize that legal fees are only given to litigants who
win their cases. They may be unwilling to risk employing a lawyer
and gambling on winning the case because if they lose they will owe
their lawyer a significant amount of money. 49 For these people, the
only choices are either litigatingpro se or not litigating at aU. 50 If
potential pro se parties cannot expect compensation for the time
spent on their cases even if they win, they face an additional disincentive to filing suit.
Awarding attorneys' fees to prose litigants thus furthers Congress' intent to facilitate the vindication of individual rights through
litigation. It is important to remember that the purpose of these attorneys' fees statutes is to encourage citizens to seek justice in the
46. S. REP No. 854, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 17 (1974). Sen. Cranston, in his remarks on the
floor in support of the FO~ noted the same deterrent effect: "This provision will discourage
unreasonable litigation by the Government undertaken for no good reason except to make as
burdensome as possible the effort of a citizen to acquire information from this Government."
120 CONG. R.Ec. 17,022 (1974).
41. See Lovell v. Alderete, 630 F.2d 428, 437 (5th Cir. 1980) (Clark, J., dissenting); Quinto
v. Legal Times of Washington, Inc., 511 F. Supp. 579,581 (D.D.C. 1981).
48. See Crooker v. United States Dept. of Justice, 632 F.2d 916, 920 (1st Cir. 1980) ("By
eliminating the obstacle of attorney fees, it ensures that all litigants have 'access to the courts to
vindicate their statutory rights.'") (quoting Nationwide Bldg. Maintenance, Inc. v. Sampson,
559 F.2d 704, 715 (D.C. Cir. 1977)); Davis v. Parratt, 608 F.2d 717, 718 (8th Cir. 1979) (per
curiam) ("The legislati~e history of Section 1988 reveals that its purpose is not to compensate
prose litigants, but to provide counsel fees to prevailing parties in order to give private citizens
a meaningful opportunity to vindicate their rights • . . .").
49. See S. REP. No. 854, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 18 (1974). ("Even the simplest FOIA case,
according to testimony, involves legal expenses of over $1,000 ••.•").
50. In Cunningham v. FBI, 664 F.2d 383 (3d Cir. 1981), the Third Circuit suggested that
contingent fees are the answer to this problem. 664 F.2d at 387 n.3. They are not. Contingent
fee arrangements are difficult to make when the plaintiff cannot offer his attorney the prospect
of a percentage of a large damage claim at the end of the lawsuit. Without such a claim, all the
plaintiff can offer is his attorneys' fees award. Since the lawyer can only count on winning a
certain percentage of his cases, this means that sometimes he will get paid for his work, sometimes he will not. Over the long run, the attorney's total earnings from these suits will fall
short of fully compensating him for his work. Thus, the attorney faces an economic disincentive to taking these cases on a convngent basis.
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courtroom.51 They were not designed to ensure that large numbers
of citizens could obtain legal representation; hiring an attorney is
merely a means of accomplishing the statutes' ultimate goal.52 To
the extent that awarding attorneys' fees to pro se litigants helps to
achieve that end, therefore, it should be considered authorized by the
statutes.
Denying awards to _pro se litigants also fails to implement the
second congressional purpose underlying attorneys' fees statutes encouraging compliance with the law. This negative effect is most
obvious when a violation has already occurred, a lawsuit has been
filed, and the defendant is debating whether to settle the claim or
continue resisting. If the defend~t knows that his _pro se opponent
cannot collect legal fees, he may delay in the hope that his opponent
will become discouraged and drop the lawsuit.53 If the pro se party
could collect attorneys' fees, the potential costs to the defendant of
resisting the claim would rise dramatically, and these costs might
discourage delaying tactics by the violator. By increasing the costs of
statutory violations,54 moreover, the awards would provide a disincentive for violating the law in the first instance.
Neither the statutes' language nor their legislative histories, then,
mandates an interpretation that precludes the award of attorneys'
fees to prevailingpro se litigants. To the contrary, the purposes for
which Congress authorized awards of attorneys' fees are not served
by limiting the class of plaintiffs eligible for the awards. Congress'
intent can be effected, therefore, by interpreting "attorney fees" to
allow prevailingpro se litigants compensation for the legal work that
they have performed.

II.

POLICY CONSIDERATIONS

This Part of the Note considers the policies implicated by awarding attorneys' fees to pro se litigants. The debate over the propriety
of such awards centers around two major issues: first, whether attorneys' fees represent justifiable compensation or an unearned windfall
for pro se litigants; and second, whether the pro se litigant's status
51. See notes 37-39 supra and accompanying text.
52. Neither are these statutes "attorney relief' statutes. During the debates on CRAFAA,
however, Sen. Allen tried to characterize the bill as an attorney relief statute. He even introduced a bill which would have renamed it "The Tunney-Kennedy Civil Rights Attorneys Relief Act." 122 CONG. REc. 31,850 (1976).
53. See Lovell v. Alderete, 630 F.2d 428, 437 (5th Cir. 1980) (Clark, J., dissenting) (''Second, faced with only a prose complainant, the Government can resist disclosure right up to the
point of losing and still escape the penalty of attorney fees.").
54. The defendant's expected cost oflitigating suits will rise in the same way that the plaintift's will fall. The defendant will continue paying his own attorneys' fees win or lose, and will
pa:y the plaintiff's fees whenever the plaintiff prevails. Thus, the defendant has an economic
incentive for avoiding lawsuits. See generally note 40 supra.
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provides a principled basis for distinguishing parties deserving fee
awards from those not deserving awards. Part II demonstrates that
nothing in these arguments persuasively rebuts Part l's conclusion
that congressional intent can best be furthered by awarding fees to
prevailingpro se litigants.
Opponents ofpro se attorneys' fees begin by arguing that pro se
litigants do not deserve compensation. Since pro se litigants spend
no money on and incur no debts for legal advice, it follows that
awarding them a fee is simply an unjustifiable windfall. 55 Any outof-pocket expenses incurred, such as printing and court fees, are recoverable as part of a costs award.56 Furthermore, they argue, even
assuming thatprose parties should receive attorneys' fees, there is no
"meaningful standard for calculating the amount of such an
award." 57
These arguments are unpersuasive because they adopt an artificially narrow definition of the pro se litigant's expenses. Pro se parties invest time instead of money in preparing their cases. Their time
has a recognized value, which is measured by·the cost of foregoing
other opportunties in order to pursue the lawsuit. 58 This "opportunity cost" is defined by economists as the value of goods that must be
given up to produce something. 59 In this case, the good given up is
time, either from work or leisure. Since the value of leisure is generally thought of as the value of what is being given up for it, namely
work, 60 the value of the time that a pro se litigant spends on his case
equals the value of the same number of hours worked at his normal
job. A pro se party should, therefore, normally receive that amount
as an attorney's fee. 61
Opponents ofpro se fees also argue that awarding fees results in
55. See Crooker v. United States Dept. of Justice, 632 F.2d 916, 920-21 (1st Cir. 1980);
Hannon v. Security Natl Bank, 531 F.2d 327, 328 n.l (9th Cir. 1976).
56. See Crooker v. United Stat~ Dept. of Justice, 632 F.2d 916, 922 (1st Cir. 1980).
51. See Crooker v. United States Dept. of Justice, 632 F.2d 916, 921 (1st Cir. 1980) ("The
impropriety of allowing the layperson litigant an attorney fee award is further underscored by
the lack of any meaningful standard for calculating the amount of such an award.").
58. See P. SAMUELSON, ECONOMICS 448 (11th ed. 1980). See also Lovell v. Alderete, 630
F.2d 428, 437 (5th Cir. 1980) (Clark, J., dissenting); Quinto v. Legal Times of Washington,
Inc., 511 F. Supp. 519, 581 (D.D.C. 1981) (''To deny such a litigant attorney's fees solely on the
grounds that he did not incur any liability to pay attorney's fees ignores the fact that a pro se
litigant must forego other activities in order to prepare and pursue his case.").
59. R. WAUD, EcONOMICS 24-25 (1980).
60. R. LIPSEY, POSITIVE EcONOMICS 477 (4th ed. 1976).
61. The Second Circuit has implied in dicta that opportunity cost may be the crucial determinant in prose cases. See Crooker v. United States Dept. of the Treasury, 634 F.2d 48, 49
(2d Cir. 1980). There is no easy reference for determining salaries in the case of the unemployed or the retired. It may be necessary, therefore, to establish some arbitrary floor for
compensation, perhaps related to the minimum wage. Such an approach acknowledges the
value of these persons' time and provides at least a minimal incentive for bringing legitimate
grievances to court. For further discussions of possible adjustments to compensation, see note
11 infra and accompanying text.
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dissimilar treatment ofpro se and counsel-represented litigants. After all, litigants who hire an attorney must still expend time and energy to help prepare their own cases, and they are not compensated
for this time. 62 Compensating pro se parties for the time that they
invest in their cases, opponents assert, would be discriminatory and

·--&'.
• 63
w.uarr.

One could logically respond that parties hiring a lawyer should
likewise be entitled to compensation for the time that they spent
helping their lawyers prepare their case.64 But it is not necessary to
go that far. Distinguishing betweenprose litigants and other parties
is rational because there are both quantitative and qualitative differences between the effort expended by the two types of litigant. First,
the pro se litigant spends much more time working on the lawsuit.
He does the work normally done by hired counsel plus whatever he
would have had to do as a client. Not granting attorneys' fees to the
pro se plaintiff, therefore, would effect a much greater injustice because much more time would be left uncompensated. Second, the
time that theprose litigant invests in the case is much more demanding. He does legal research, plans strategy, writes briefs, and argues
his case. His .counterpart who hired an attorney need only answer
his lawyer's questions and appear in court at the proper times. Because of these differences, the dissimilar treatment afforded to pro se
litigants and those who hire attorneys does not seem unfair.
The second major line of argument would restrict awards of attorneys' fees by making recovery dependent upon theprose litigant's
stat~st One branch of this argument distinguishes attorneys representi.Iig themselves pro se from lay pro se litigants. The Ninth Circuit, for example, has allowed attorneys' fees for lawyers who
represent themselves, but not for laymen. 65 The Fifth Circuit, while
denying counsel fees to pro se lay litigants under both the Privacy
Act66 and the CRAPAA67 has specifically left open the question
62. Parties to a lawsuit cannot even be awarded their expenses as witnesses in their own
case, even though witness expenses are normally recoverable under 28 U.S.C, § 1920(3) (1976);
see C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, supra note 29, § 2678.
63. See Cunningham v. FBI, 664 F.2d 383, 386 (3d Cir. 1981); Crooker v. United States
Dept. of Justice, 632 F.2d 916, 921 (1st Cir. 1980).
64. See Parker v. Lewis, [1981] 4 EMPL. PRAc. GUIDE (CCH) (27 Empl. Prac. Dec.)
f 32,153 (D.D.C. June 30, 1981), where the court allowed the plaintiff, herself an attorney, to
collect attorneys' fees for the work she had done on her own case even though she had hired
several other lawyers to represent her. The case was brought under Title VII of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-16 (1976).
·
65. See Ellis v. Cassidy; 625 F.2d 227, 230-31 (9th Cir. 1980) (attorney allowed to collect
prose fees); Hannon v. Security Natl. Bank, 537 F.2d 327, 329 (9th Cir. 1976) (refused to grant
pro se fees to a law school graduate). The Fourth Circuit, on the other hand, has gone on
record denying attorneys' fees for all prose litigants, including lawyers, at least in TILA ~ See White v. Arlen Realty Dev. Corp., 614 F.2d 387, 389 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 441 U.S. 923
(1980).
66. Barrett v. Bureau of Customs, 651 F.2d 1087, 1090 (5th Cir. 1981).
67. Cofield v. City of Atlanta, 648 F.2d 986, 987 (5th Cir. 1981).
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whether attorneys acting pro se can collect attorneys, fees. 68 The
courts have not fully spelled out the reasons underlying this distinction; presumably i~ rests in part on attorneys, acknowledged expertise in the practice of law.
The distinction between attorneys and nonattorneys, however, is
not well-founded. A nonlawyer appearingpro se performs the same
functions as a lawyer even though he does not have the same level of
training. "[W]hen persons exercise their right to represent themselves before the bar of justice they are in every sense functioning as
attorneys: they do research, file pleadings and advocate their
cause."69 The only difference between lawyers and nonlawyers lies
in the skill and efficiency with which they perform their work. The
lawyer's superior training presumably will result in more effective
performance. It is not clear, however, why this difference should be a
basis for denying f~es to the pro s_e litigant since it will be reflected in
the frequency with which the parties are compensated - they only
collect a fee when they win a case. It can also be reflected in the rate
at which the parties are compensated if a pro se party's rate of compensation is tied to his regular salary.70 Since most nonattorney pro
se parties will have lower incomes than lawyers, they will receive
proportionately less in attorneys' fees. 71
68. Barrett v. Bureau of Customs, 651 F.2d 1087, 1089 (5th Cir. 1981). The Third Circuit,
while denyingpro se fees to nonlawyers, has also deferred decision on prose attorneys. See
Cunningham v. FBI, 664 F.2d 383,385 n.l (3d Cir. 1981). The Second Circuit apparently has
made incarceration the dividing line on eligibility for pro se attorneys' fees. In Crooker v.
United States Dept. of the Treasury, 634 F.2d 48 (2d Cir. 1980), the Second Circuit refused to
award attorneys' fees in an FOIA case to a successful pro se litigant who was also a prisoner.
In so doing, the court implied that pro se fees might be acceptable for nonprisoner pro se
litigants. The court seemed concerned that the prisoner, unlike his counterparts in the outside
world, would not be able to demonstrate that the time spent preparing his case was time diverted from any gainful employment. 634 F.2d at 49. The court opined that the FOIA was not
intended to be "a cottage industry for prisoners." 634 F.2d at 49. The court is at least acknowledging the opportunity cost approach's validity. See text at notes 58-61 supra. The
plaintiff in Crooker was also the plaintiff in two other important FOIA pro se attorneys' fees
cases, brought in different circuits. See Crooker v. United States Dept. of Justice, 632 F.2d 916
(1st Cir. 1980); Crooker v. United States Dept. of the Treasury, No. 80-1412 (D.C. Cir. Oct. 23,
1980). A different prisoner has been involved in two other important pro se. cases. See Lovell
v. Snow, 637 F.2d 170 (1st Cir. 1981); Lovell v. Alderete, 630 F.2d 428 (5th Cir. 1980).
69. Holly v. Acree, 72 F.R.D. 115, 116 (D.D.C. 1976), ajfd sub nom. Holly v. Chasen, 569
F.2d 160 (D.C. Cir. 1977).
70. See text at notes 60-61 supra.
71. As the income of the potentialprose litigant approaches that of the average lawyer, the
litigant is more likely to hire his own lawyer because he can better afford to assume the risk of
suing and losing. There is, of course, a possibility that some prose litigants may have incomes
equal to or greater than the average lawyer. To protect the defendant in these cases from
being unfairly burdened because his opponent happened to proceed prose, it will be necessary
to place a ceiling on the pro se award. For example, the court might award only an amount
equal to what an average lawyer would have charged had he been hired for the 1?15e, This
limitation can be justified on the grounds that all of the statutes require that awards of attorneys' fees be "reasonable." See note 16 supra. There is also some suggestion that the reasonableness requirement can be used as a tool for limiting large pro se awards on the basis of
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The straightforward nature of the proceedings under the four
statutes being examined, moreover, may make attorneys' greater expertise irrelevant. Pro se cases tend to be self-selecting. If the case is
complicated, a prospective plaintiff will either hire a lawyer or not
bother to proceed. But cases arising under these four statutes often
involve simple issues and few factual questions. In a typical FOIA
case, for example, there is a request for information from a government agency, a denial of some or all of that information based on
one or more statutory exceptions, a suit in federal court to force the
release of the requested information, and a decision by the court as
to who is entitled to have the information. Because little legal expertise is required, the distinction between attorneys and nonattorneys
tends to evaporate in this context.
A second branch of the status-based argument against fee awards
asserts that allpro se litigants are a burden to the judicial system and
hence should not be encouraged. In White v. Arlen Realty and Development Corp., 72 for example, the Fourth Circuit refused to allowpro
se attorneys to collect legal fees because it felt that they lacked the
necessary "detached and objective perspective"73 to conduct an effective case. They become too involved with their own problem, argue with the judge, and frequently lose their cases because of bad
tactical decisions.74 Similar complaints have been raised against
nonattorneys: They are inexperienced, overly involved, and a hindrance to the efficient administration of justice.75 For these reasons,
it is argued, the courts should not encouragepro se parties to participate in the legal system by awarding them attorneys' fees. 76
This argument's logic leaves much to be desired. It condemnspro
se attorneys' fees because they encourage litigation - the very purexcessive hours worked. In Jones v. United States Secret Service, 81 F.R.D. 700 (D.D.C.
1979), the court cut the hours claimed by the plaintiff' in half on grounds of the plaintiffs
inexperience. 81 F.R.D. at 702. This approach is somewhat arbitrary, and perhaps unnecessary in light of this Note's proposed "average attorney'' limitation discussed above. Nonetheless, reducing the hours claimed does offer an alternative to courts concerned about excessive
pro se awards.
72. 614 F.2d 387 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 441 U.S. 923 (1980).
73. 614 F.2d at 388.
74. 614 F.2d at 388.
75. Barrett v. Bureau of Customs, 651 F.2d 1087, 1089-90 (5th Cir. 1981) ("Persons contemplating legal action should be encouraged to consult with attorneys. Litigation may not be
necessary. Frustrations and misunderstandings or failures of understanding by the intended
complainant may be quickly soothed and resolved by counsel"); Crooker v. United States
Dept. of Justice, 632 F.2d 916, 920 (1st Cir. 1980) ("[T)he complainant [who] represents himself, sometimes [is] a hinderance instead of an aid to the judicial process .•..").
16. See White v. Arlen Realty & Dev. Corp., 614 F.2d 387, 389 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 441
U.S. 923 (1980) ("The goals of the Act are not fostered by self-representation or fee generation,
but rather by independent professional advocacy. Therefore, we adopt a simple rule for
Truth-in-Lending actions: plaintiffs who are not represented by attorneys may not be awarded
attorney fees.").
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pose for which Congress enacted the attorneys' fees statutes. 77 If
granting legal fees to pro se plaintiffs will induce more of them to
pursue their claims in court, that is reason to be pleased, not distressed. It is not altogether apparent, moreover, thatpro se attorneys
do an unsatisfactory job of pleading their causes.78 In addition,
many nonattorney pro se parties, such as law students and paralegals, have had sufficient legal training to make them reasonably
well-qualified to conduct a lawsuit.79
The real objection underlying the claims of efficiency and burdens may be a fear that awarding attorneys' fees to pro se parties will
generate a flood of litigants in the federal courts who are more interested in collecting legal fees than in vindicating any substantive
right. If so, there are several reasons not to be overly concerned.
Attorneys' fees can be recovered only if the plaintiff wins his case,
and people without a legitimate claim and a reasonable chance of
victory are not likely to file suit. In addition, judicial screening
mechanisms already exist for weeding out frivolous claims before
substantial judicial resources have been expended: Since many pro
se parties are indigent, they file their claims in forma pallJJeris, 80 a
form of pleading that allows the court to waive filing fees. 81 The
statute allowing the waiver of fees also allows the judge to dismiss
the complaint without even a preliminary hearing if he thinks it is
frivolous. 82 For those parties who do not proceed informapallJJeris,
the filing fees represent a significant out-of-pocket expense and
should discourage plaintiffs from filing long-shot claims. Claims
surviving these hurdles that prove meritless can always be dismissed
at the demurrer or summary judgment stages. If the claims are meritorious, on the other hand, they deserve a hearing in court. 83 That
hearing should not be discouraged by arbitrary denials of legal expenses when such expenses are authorized by law and when Congress has indicated its desire to encourage judicial vindication of the
rights protected by these statutes.
11. See text at notes 37-40 supra.
18. See Ellis v. Cassidy, 625 F.2d 227 (9th Cir. 1980); Cuneo v. Rumsfeld, 553 F.2d 1360
(D.C. Cir. 1977). See generally R. CoHN, A FooL FOR A CLIENT (1971) (being Cohn's description of his successful prose defenses against a number of criminal charges),
79. Several important prose attorneys' fees cases have been brought by law students. See
Hannon v. Security Natl. Ban]c, 537 F.2d 327 (9th Cir. 1976); Quinto v. Legal Times of Washington, Inc., 511 F. Supp. 579 (D.D.C. 1981).
80. "In the character or manner of a pauper." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 701 (5th ed.
1979).
·
81. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a) (1976).
82. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(d) (1976).
83. Prose litigants frequently make important contributions to the system ofjustice in this
country. For a discussion of the Second Circuit's experience with prose litigants, see Flannery
& Robbins, Tlte Misunderstood Pro Se Litigant: More Titan A Pawn In Tlte Game, 41 BROOK·
LYN L. REV. 769 (1975).
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CONCLUSION

Federal courts should adopt the practice of awarding attorneys'
fees to prevailingpro se litigants who bring claims under attorneys'
fees statutes. Analysis of four major statutes and their respective legislative histories shows that awarding fees to parties who represent
themselves in the courtroom furthers the purposes for which these
statutes were enacted and, therefore, would probably have been favored by Congress had it expressly considered the issue. An opportunity cost approach to valuation provides the court with a
reasonable method for determining the amount of compensation that
a nonlawyer pro se litigant should receive, namely, an amount equal
.to what he would earn working the same number of hours at his
normal job.
Since self-representation may be the only reasonable option for
many who seek to protect their rights, courts should remove any unnecessary barriers to the exercise of that option. Litigants have a
statutorily guaranteed right, dating from the founding of the Republic, to represent themselves in federal court. 84 This right deserves
some protection. We are a nation that prides itself on providing
equal justice for all. If some citizens feel compelled, for whatever
reason, to seek their justice in person, we should not discourage them
from doing so.

84. See note 4 supra.

